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SOLDIER OF ORANGE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE, 
DIPLOMATIC, LEGISLATIVE AND LITIGATORY 
IMPACT OF HERBICIDE AGENT ORANGE IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM 
Bruce F. Meyers * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Little could British naturalist Charles Darwin have anticipated 
that his dedicated research in plant-growth regulation in 1880 
would lead to subsequent development and manufacture of man-
made growth regulators, later called phenoxy herbicides.1 Nor 
could he have anticipated that his research would lead to the 
highly controversial, first wartime use of such herbicides some 
eighty years later. A host of administrative, diplomatic, legislative 
and litigatory responses were spawned by this first military usage 
and in the nineteen years following to the present. 
This article will briefly review the United States' development 
and use of herbicides in South Vietnam, and will discuss subse-
quent ramifications flowing from their use, resulting in a number 
of responsive actions by virtually every branch of our govern-
ment. These actions have already affected many of the millions of 
• Mr. Meyers served in Vietnam as a Colonel of Marines and was Regimental Com-
mander of the 26th Marine Regiment at Khesanh in 1968. The areas around Khesanh were 
among the most heavily sprayed during the use of Agent Orange. He is currently a gradu-
ate fellow at Yale Law School in an LL.M. program in medical jurisprudence while on 
leave as Associate Dean at the University of Puget Sound Law School. Mr. Meyers is serv-
ing as a consultant to the plaintiffs in the class action suit discussed in his article. 
The author would like to acknowledge Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Simeon E. Baldwin Profes-
sor of Law at Yale, whose seminar on "Toxic Substances" was the encouragement for this 
article. 
J Davis, Donald E., Herbicides in Peace and War, BIOSCIENCE, Feb., 1979, 84, 84. 
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former service persons who served in Vietnam during the period 
1962-1971. Although the civilian use of many of these same herbi-
cides is concomitantly hosting a similar series of regulatory and 
litigatory issues, their detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this 
article which will address primarily the military use and issues 
flowing therefrom. 
II. HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT AND USE 
Subsequent to Darwin's discovery of phototrophic (light seek-
ing) response in plant cells and the chemical isolation of auxin 
(beta indole acetic acid), synthesis of similar growth-regulating 
compounds was conducted, resulting in the development of two 
phenoxy herbicides in use today: 2,4-D (2,4-dichlorophenoxy 
acetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxy acetic acid). In 
August of 1941, a botanist at the University of Chicago suggested 
research of the possible use of growth-regulators as "plant kill-
ers."2 World War II spurred further development and testing and, 
in 1943, the U.S. Army began research in earnest toward the mili-
tary applications of herbicides in war.S This grew out of a warning 
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to the Secretary of 
War of the potential dangers (to the United States) of biological 
warfare.· 
The outstanding effectiveness of these two herbicides in con-
trolling the growth of broad-leaved plants and weeds, coupled 
with their apparently low mammalian toxicity and low applica-
tion rates, resulted in their rapid acceptance in world agriculture. 
Peterson& reported that the annual production of 2,4-D alone ex-
ceeded 14,000 pounds in 1950 and by 1960 manufacturers (princi-
pally American) were producing 36 million pounds. 
Herbicides were not used in World War II, but a small program 
for screening potential herbicides for possible military use contin-
ued after the war. In 1959 the first large-scale military defoliation 
by aerial application using the butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T 
was conducted at Ft. Drum, New York. The success of these tests 
spurred the Office of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 
May of 1961 to request feasibility tests for defoliation of jungle 
• Peterson, G.E., The Discovery and Development of 2,4-D, 41 AGR. HIST., 243 (1967) 
[hereinafter Peterson]. 
• Id. 
• Davis, supra note 1, at 91. 
• Peterson, supra note 2. 
1979] AGENT ORANGE 161 
vegetation in Vietnam}' The results of these tests (first conducted 
in Thailand, later in South Vietnam (SVN» were that significant 
defoliation and anticrop effects could be obtained with two differ-
ent mixtures of herbicides. The first was a mixture of the n-butyl 
esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T and the iso-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T. This 
mixture was code-named "Purple". The second "military" herbi-
cide was code-named "Blue" and was composed of the acid and 
sodium salt of cacodylic acid. The code names referred to the 
color of bands (Orange, White, Blue, Purple, Pink and Green) 
which had been painted around the center of the 55-gallon drum 
containers that were used to ship the herbicide to South Vietnam. 
They were painted in this manner in order to aid in identification 
by the personnel using them.7 The initial choice of herbicides 
used in Vietnam was based: "upon the chemicals that had had 
considerable research, proven performance, and the practical 
background. Also other factors had to be considered, such as 
availability in large quantity, costs and known or proven safety in 
regard to their toxicity to humans and animals . . . . "8 
Purple and Blue were the first herbicides to arrive in Vietnam 
in January 1962. They were followed shortly thereafter by Pink 
(mixtures of n- and iso-butyls of 2,4,5-T), and Green (composed 
of the n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T), followed in 1965 by Orange and 
White (picloram). Herbicide Orange replaced all uses of Purple, 
Pink and Green and eventually became the most widely used mil-
itary herbicide in SVN.e Agent Orange was sprayed from aircraft 
(mostly C-123's) that could carry 1,000 gallons of herbicide and 
deposit 3 gallons per acre in swaths 240 feet wide for defoliation 
and crop destruction missions.10 Herbicide Orange was a 50:50 
mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. The component 2,4,5-T was later 
found to contain a contaminant, TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-
a Young, A.L., Capt. USAF, The Toxicology, Environmental Fate and Human Risk of 
Herbicide Orange and its Associated Dioxin, USAF Occupational and Environmental 
Health Laboratory Technical Report TR-7B-02 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter USAF HERBICIDE 
ORANGE REPORT], at 1-2. . 
? Id. at 1-2. 
8 Brown, J. W., Vegetational Spray Tests in South Vietnam, U.S. Army Chemical 
Corps Biological Laboratories, Ft. Detrick, MD, 119 p., Available from Defense Documen-
tation Center, Alexandria, VA, DOC Number AD 476961 (1962) (emphasis added) [herein-
after Brown]. 
• USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-3. 
'0 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: Agent Orange: Veterans' Complaints Concerning 
Exposure to Herbicides in South Vietnam, Issue Brief Number IB79255, Library of Con-
gress, (Oct. 19, 1979), [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH], at p.CRS-4. 
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dibenzo para-dioxin) [dioxin] which is one of the most toxic 
chemicals known. ll [See Table I, appended]. 
Military herbicide operations were carried out from 1962 to 
1971. They were used primarily for (1) defoliation of trees and 
plants to improve observation and prevent ambush of friendly 
forces and (2) for destroying food crops of hostile forces. 12 After a 
relatively slow buildup from 1962 to 1965, herbicide operations 
increased rapidly to a peak in 1967; then declined slightly in 1968 
and 1969 and dropped sharply in 1970 to eventually stop in 
1971.18 Defense estimates that approximately 17.7 million gallons 
of herbicides were sprayed during the nine-year period: 10.65 mil-
lion gallons of Orange, 5.63 million gallons of White, 1.14 million 
gallons of Blue, 145,000 gallons of Purple and 130,000 gallons of 
Pink and Green. The National Academy of Sciences estimated 
that of the 3.6 million acres sprayed, 66 percent was sprayed once, 
22 percent was sprayed twice, 8 percent was sprayed three or 
more times, and 4 percent was sprayed four or more times. 1. Her-
bicide Orange was sprayed undiluted in Vietnam at the rate of 
about 3 gallons (containing 12 pounds of 2,4-D and 13.8 pounds 
of 2,4,5-T) per acre. lIi Civilian applications of this herbicide's 
components are usually diluted in oil and water. According to in-
dustry officials, the civilian application rate of 2,4,5-T varies from 
1 to 4 pounds per acre.16 A defense official stated that the heavier 
applications were necessary to assure success of the herbicide op-
11 General Accounting Office, Report by the Comptroller General: Health Effects of Ex-
posure to Herbicide Orange in South Vietnam Should be Resolved, GAO CED-79-22 at 2 
(April 6, 1979) [hereinafter GAO REQUEST, 1979] at p.2: See also J. McCullough, Herbi-
cides: Environmental Health Effects; Vietnam and the Geneva Protocol: Developments 
During 1970, 7 (1970) (Congressional Research Report No. UG 447, 70-303SP) [hereinafter 
McCullough]. A portion of this report is reproduced as Table I, infra . 
.. Asst. Sec. of State Dixon Donnelly, quoted in Galston, Herbicides in Vietnam, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 1967, at 19-21 (1967). Also see testimony of Rear Admiral William E. 
Lemos USN, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chemical Biological Warfare: u.s. 
Policies and International Effects. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Secur-
ity Policy and Scientific Developments, (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970) p.231 
(91st Cong., 1st Sess.) Nov. 18, 20; Dec. 2, 9, 18 and 19, 1969) [hereinafter U.S. Congress, 
Foreign Affairs, Chemical Biological Warfare, 1970]. 
13 GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 29 . 
.. Id. at 2 . 
.. Since Herbicide Orange is a 50:50 mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, an average TCDD 
contaminant level of two parts per million (ppm) would indicate that the 2,4,5-T compo-
nent, as manufactured, contained TCDD levels averaging about 4 ppm. GAO REQUEST 
1979, supra note 11 at 2, 3 n.1. 
1. GAO REQUEST 1979 supra note 11 and Young supra note 6, at 1-2 through 1-15. 
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erations. They further advised that because of the dense jungle 
canopy, the amount of herbicide penetrating to the forest floor 
(six percent of that applied)!? would have been similar to those 
normally applied to brush-infested ranch land in the United 
States.18 
When one converts the millions of gallons sprayed, supra, to 
pounds of herbicide, the 44 million pounds of 2,4,5-T contained 
an estimated 368 pounds of the toxic contaminant TCDD or di-
oxin. (NAS estimated that between 220-368 pounds of TCDD 
were released over South Vietnam during the period August 1965 
to February 1971).19 Ninety-six percent of all 2,4,5-T was in Her-
bicide Orange; the remaining four percent was in Green, Pink and 
Purple (which contained approximately 40 percent [143 pounds] 
of the estimated TCDD disseminated throughout South Viet-
nam). Green, Pink and Purple were sprayed as defoliants on less 
than 90,000 acres from 1962 through 1964, when only a small 
force of U.S. military personnel were in South Vietnam. Ninety 
percent of all of the Herbicide Orange (containing 38.3 million 
pounds of 2,4,5-T and 203 pounds of TCDD) was used in defolia-
tion operations on 2.9 million acres of inland forests and man-
grove forest.2o [This incongruity of amounts sprayed varying in-
versely to the numbers of personnel serving in South Vietnam, 
complicates the analysis of what the actual exposure to U.S. 
forces might have been, i.e. when the more toxic Agents Green, 
Pink and Purple were being used (1962-1964), there were only 
relatively small numbers of service personnel in South Vietnam 
and, as the later (and relatively less toxic) Agent Orange was be-
ing sprayed from 1965 through 1971, its more extensive use was 
concomitant to the massive buildup of American forces to 2.6 mil-
lion service personnel]. 21 A high Veterans Administration (VA) 
17 House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 95th Congo 2d Sess., Herbicide "Agent Orange", 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Medical Facilities and Benefits. (Oct. 11, 1978) 
[hereinafter Veterans' Hearings], (Statement of Maj. Gen. Garth Dettinger USAF, Deputy 
Surgeon General USAF, id. at 12); see also USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 
6, at 1-20; and Tschirley, Response of Tropical and Subtropical Woody Plants to Chemi-
cal Treatments, RESEARCH REPORT CR-13-67. AGR. RES. SERVICES, USDA, Wash., D.C. 
(1968) [hereinafter Tschirley]. 
18 GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11 at 2., and Veterans' Hearings supra note 17, at 12 . 
• 8 USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6 at 1-26, and Committee on the Ef-
fects of Herbicides in South Vietnam, Nat'l Academy of Science, Part A. Summary and 
Conclusions at 398 (1974) . 
•• USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-26 . 
.. GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 6. 
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official has indicated that during the period 1962 through 1971 it 
was "theoretically possible that about 4.2 million American 
soldiers could have made transient or significant contact with the 
herbicides because of this operation (Ranch Hand - the code 
name assigned by the Air Force to the herbicide spraying 
missions) " . 22 
III. TERMINATION OF HERBICIDE USE IN VIETNAM 
The decision leading to the termination on April 15, 1970 of all 
military herbicide use was caused by a fascinating interplay of 
diverse elements of our political fabric-scientific, regulatory, 
diplomatic and legislative. These included the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS), the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the Na-
tional Institute of Health (NIH), the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) , a spate of independent 
scientists, a host of executive departments and agencies, the de-
partments of Defense, Agriculture, Interior and HEW, the Air 
Force, the Surgeon General, the State Department, the Office of 
the President, and the Congress itself. 
One of the first distinguished scholars to voice concern for the 
continued use of herbicides containing the toxic substance dioxin 
was Yale botanist Arthur W. Galston, at the time President-elect 
of the Botanical Society of America. In his 1967 article in the 
New Republic, Professor Galston voiced a warning of the poten-
tial hazards of continued unbridled use of herbicides that was all 
too prophetic: "we are too ignorant of the interplay of forces in 
ecological problems to know how far-reaching and how lasting will 
be the changes in ecology brought about by the widespread spray-
ing of herbicides in Vietnam. These changes may include immedi-
ate harm to people in sprayed areas. . . . "23 
The Department of Defense (DOD) was not unmindful of the 
growing criticism within the scientific community on the depart-
ment's use of herbicides in Vietnam. Each year the justification 
for continuation of Operation Ranch Hand was reviewed. In 1967, 
DOD contracted with Midwest Research Institute (MRI) of Kan-
•• Hearings, supra note 17, at 27 (Testimony of Dr. Paul Haber, Asst. Chief Medical 
Director for Professional Services, Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C.) . 
• a Galston, Arthur W., Herbicides in Vietnam, NEW REPUBLIC, 19-21 (Nov. 25, 1967), 
see also Galston, Plants, People and Politics, BIOSCIENCE, VOL. 20, p. 408 (April 1, 1970) 
and Galston, Herbicides: No Margin of Safety, in SCIENCE, VOL. 167, p. 237 (Jan. 16, 
1970). 
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sas City, Missouri, for an in-depth assessment of the ecological 
effects of extensive or repeated use of herbicides. MRI concluded 
that the greatest short-term or long-term ecological consequence 
(in South Vietnam) was the "destruction of the vegetation ... ", 
the long-term effects on wildlife were unpredictable (some good, 
some bad), "the herbicides used (in South Vietnam) ... will not 
persist in the soil for a long period of time . . . " and, finally, " 
. . . the possibility of lethal toxicity to humans . . . is highly 
unlikely and should not be a matter of deep concern . ... "24 
Both NAS and AAAS reviewed the report following its publica-
tion in December of 1967 and felt that although it was a credita-
ble review of the available scientific literature relating to herbi-
cides and their ecological effects, it was only a first step in such 
an investigation. sa 
In September 1968, the U.S. Department of State released an 
assessment of the ecological consequences of the defoliation pro-
gram in South Vietnam. Tschirley, a plant ecologist, visited South 
Vietnam for one month and later published the results of his ob-
servations in Science (the Journal of the AAAS). Major conclu-
sions reached by Tschirley included: "The defoliation has caused 
ecologic change, not irreversible, but recovery will take a long 
time . . . The effect on animals is not known, but it does not ap-
pear to have been extreme . . . There is no evidence to suggest 
that the herbicide used in Vietnam will cause toxicity for man or 
animals. . . . "28 In order to supplement Tschirley's report, the 
Society for Social Responsibility in Science sponsored a visit by 
two zoologists in March 1969. Orians and Pfeiffer published their 
report in 1970. In contrast to the prior reports, they reported the 
ecological consequences of defoliation were severe, especially in 
areas receiving repetitive applications of defoliants. Little evi-
dence of toxic effects of herbicides to animals was found, al-
though they did receive a report (by interview) of many sick and 
dying birds and mammals. This report was not investigated. No 
evidence was found that the herbicides had direct adverse effects 
•• House, W.B. et ai, Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of 
Herbicides, MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Kansas City, Missouri). Sponsored by DOD: 
ARPA Order 1086, Final MRI Report No. 3103-B, 369 p.(1967) (emphasis added), quoted 
at length in USAF Herbicide Orange Report, supra note 6, at V-13 . 
•• Anonymous. A Preliminary Assessment of Herbicides and Defoliation, ENVIRON. SCI. 
TECHNOL., 2(3):176-181 (1968) . 
•• Tschirley, F.H., Defoliation in Vietnam, 163 SCIENCE, 779 (1969). 
166 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:159 
on human health, although they did receive reports on the tre-
mendous impact on remote mountain people.27 
At this point, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) entered 
the scene, albeit involuntarily. In a February 1969 meeting of the 
National Academy of Science/National Research Council Com-
mittee, a copy of a "confidential" report prepared by the Bionet-
ics Research Council Committee (BRC) (who had been employed 
by USDA to study the mutagenic, carcinogenic and teratogenic 
potential of a very large number [140] of commonly used pesti-
cides) was shown to this influential committee. This study used 
highly susceptible test animals that were treated with massive 
doses of pesticides. Since the USDA had paid for the study, the 
report was made to them. In these studies, 2,4,5-T showed a "sig-
nificant potential to increase birth defects."28 
About four months after the NAS Committee had seen the 
BRC report (June or JUly 1969), the first reports of human birth 
defects allegedly attributed to Herbicide Orange appeared in 
Vietnamese newspapers between June 26 and July 5,1969.211 They 
blamed the increases on the chemicals used in defoliation. There 
is still no unanimity regarding interpretation of these findings. 
The number of recorded birth defects did significantly increase, 
however. Saigon is not in the area where most of the defoliation 
missions were flown, and similar increases in birth defects were 
not recorded in areas where defoliation was much more exten-
sive.30 [E.g., one could take note of the concomitant influx of 
American doctors and other medical personnel into the Saigon 
area, which might have had a positive impact on better record 
keeping, thus explaining to some degree the apparent increase.] 
A sense of greater urgency was attached to the mounting na-
tional concern about 2,4,5-T when, in October 1969, Dr. Lee F. 
Dubridge, Science Advisor to the President, announced that there 
.. Orians & Pfeiffer, Ecological Effects of the War in Vietnam, 168 SCIENCE 554 (1970) . 
•• Davis, supra note 1, at 92, and telephone interview of Nov. 1, 1979 by Bruce F. Mey-
ers with Prof. Donald Davis (Auburn Univ., member of 1968-69 National Academy of Sci-
ence/National Research Council Committee on Persistent Pesticides) . 
•• Advisory Committee on 2,4,5-T. Report of the Advisory Committee on 2,4,5-T to the 
Advisor of the Environmental Protection Agency of May 7, 1971 (unpublished), quoted in 
EPA RPAR on 2,4,5-T at 43 Fed. Reg. 17124, 17144 n.48 (1978) [hereinafter Advisory 
Committee Report on 2,4,5-7'], and USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT supra note 6, at V-
14. 
O. Davis, supra note 1, at 92. 
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would be a partial curtailment of the use of this herbicide.31 Fol-
lowing this announcement by the Office of the President, the De-
partment of Defense restricted the use of Herbicide Orange to ar-
eas remote from population in South Vietnam. These actions 
were prompted by the National Institute of Health (NIH) report 
that 2,4,5-T could cause malformations and stillbirths in mice.32 
In all probability, the "leaking" to the press of the USDA re-
port (allegedly by a member of "Nader's Raiders", who "sug-
gested" that USDA was trying to "hide" the adverse report) 
prompted the Surgeon General of the United States on April 15, 
1970 to issue an opinion that the use of 2,4,5-T might be hazard-
ous to "our health".33 He was immediately strongly criticized by 
some for not acting sooner.3• 
On April 15, 1970 the Secretaries of Agriculture, HEW, and the 
Interior, jointly announced the suspension of certain uses of 2,4,5-
T. These suspensions resulted from published studies indicating 
that 2,4,5-T was a teratogen.3& On the same day, the Department 
of Defense suspended all use of Herbicide Orange, containing the 
2,4,5-T.36 The Dow Chemical Company, the primary manufac-
turer of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D, predictably denied this teratogenicity, 
stating that according to their tests (with 2,4,5-T that had been 
produced in accordance with their product jon specifications) 
there was no indication of any fetal abnormalities.37 However, the 
Dow tests did confirm the Bionetics Research Council (BRC) 
findings that, when dioxin was present in quantities exceeding 
(then-current) production specifications, birth defects did occur.38 
3J McCullough, supra note 11, at 11 . 
•• GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 3. 
33 Davis, supra note 1, at 93 . 
•• WHITESIDE, T., The Pendulum and the Toxic Cloud: The Course of Dioxin Contami-
nation, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, CT (1979) [hereinafter WHITESIDE], at p. 1. 
•• The Secretaries' actions were taken because of evidence indicating "that 2,4,5-T, as 
well as its contaminant, dioxins, may produce abnormal development in unborn animals. 
Nearly pure 2,4,5-T was reported to cause birth defects when injected at high doses into 
experimental pregnant mice but not in rats. No data on humans are available." April 15, 
1970 announcement of U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of Interior, U.S. Dept. 
of Health, Education and Welfare, quoted in Dow Chemical v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 
1317, 1319 (8th Cir. 1973), [hereinafter Dow v. Ruckelshaus]; see also Whiteside, supra 
note 34, at 2, and USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT supra note 6, at II-I. 
•• [d. and USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra at II-I and, McCullough, supra note 
11 at 20. 
37 Flint, Jerry, Dow Aides Deny Herbicide Risk, in N.Y. Times, March 18, 1970, at 72 . 
•• McCullough, supra note 11, at 13. 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS REGARDING 2,4,5-T AND/OR DIOXIN 
Congress was keenly aware of the growing storm against the 
military use of herbicides. Within the Senate, attempts to block 
further use of herbicides in Vietnam were initiated by a proposed 
amendment (No. 784) to the authorization of appropriations for 
military procurement which prohibited U.S. military use of an-
tiplant weapons and prohibited the transfer of such weapons for 
use by second countries (presumably to prevent transfer to 
Vietnamese forces to permit them to do what the Congress was 
forbidding U.S. forces to do). The amendment also provided for 
the elimination of the present stockpile of antiplant chemical 
weapons (AgentOrange).89 When this amendment was defeated 
by a voice vote of 62-22, another amendment (No. 863) was of-
fered which proposed the prohibition of crop destruction in war-
fare. '0 This amendment was also defeated by a vote of 48-33. u 
The Senate was obviously attempting to balance the growing crit-
icism of the use of herbicides against the "undisputable" saving 
of American lives. U 
Both houses of Congress wanted more information on the possi-
ble toxicity of the herbicides in use. The House of Representa-
tives was able to implement this desire by its appropriation ac-
tion with respect to the military procurement bill for 1971. They 
directed the Secretary of Defense to arrange with the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study on the effects of 
herbicides in South Vietnam, including health effects." A prior 
portion of the same section of the Act precluded expenditure of 
any funds for procurement of any "lethal chemical or any biologi-
cal warfare agents . . . ",. and in the event of any disposal of 
such elements that "such agents [be] detoxified or made harmless 
a. u.s. Congress. Congressional Record at S11524-33 (July 16, 1970) (authorization for 
military procurement and other purposes). 
•• U.S. Congress. Congressional Record at S14240-58 (August 26, 1970) . 
.. Congressional Record at S14419 (August 27, 1970) . 
•• E.g. "For whatever the possible side effects of our herbicide program, its primary 
contribution is indisputable: it has saved the lives of Americans in Vietnam." Id . 
•• Public Law No. 91-441, sec. 506(c), 84 Stat. 905, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Oct. 7, 1970: 
"(c) (1) The Secretary of Defense shall undertake to enter into appropriate arrange-
ments with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive study and 
investigation to determine (A) the ecological and physiological dangers inherent in the 
use of herbicides, and (B) the ecological and physiological effects by the defoliation 
program carried out by the Department of Defense in South Vietnam." 
•• Id. at 506(a). 
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to man and his environment."411 
V. DISPOSAL OF HERBICIDES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM 
In September 1971, the Department of Defense directed that 
the Herbicide Orange remaining in South Vietnam be returned to 
the United States and directed that the entire 2.22 million gallons 
(unexpended) be disposed of in an "environmentally safe and effi-
cient manner." At the time of the DOD suspension of its use, 
there were 1.37 million gallons of Herbicide Orange in South Vi~ 
etnam and 0.85 million gallons at the Naval Construction Battal-
ion Center (NCBC) at Gulfport, Mississippi. The 1.37 million gal-
lons were removed from South Vietnam in April 1972 to remote 
Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean for storage pending dispo-
sal!6 Various techniques of destruction and/or recovery of the 
herbicides used in South Vietnam were investigated between 1971 
and 1974. Destructive techniques that were considered included 
soil biodegradation, high temperature incineration, deep-well in-
jection, burial in underground nuclear test cavities, sludge burial 
and microbial reduction. Recovery techniques that were being ex-
amined (in order to possibly recover a useful product) included 
use, return to the manufacturers, fractionation and chlorinolyses. 
Of the techniques considered, only high temperature incinera-
tion was sufficiently developed to warrant further investigation. 
The others were rejected for a number of reasons, including inad-
equate assurance of success, long lead-times for development of 
efficient methods, and a complete lack of industrial interest!7 Ini-
tially, the Air Force proposed to incinerate the remaining stocks 
at a commercial incineration site in Deer Park, Texas. The Texas 
Air Control Board was less than ecstatic about the prospect of 
spreading toxic contaminant byproducts over the Texas country-
side!8 In a like manner, the Mississippi Air and Pollution Control 
•• [d. at 506(d) . 
•• The average concentration of TCDD in the Agent Orange awaiting disposal was 2 
ppm and the total amount of TCDD in the entire stock was approximately 44.1 
pounds. USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-1. 
.. [d. As to the last mentioned possibility, when the USAF asked the manufacturers 
to take the Agent Orange back (according to a subsequent statement made to the EPA 
by an Air Force official) this proposal "created what might be known as a wide wave of 
disinterest on the part of manufacturers," WHITESIDE, supra note 34, at 20 . 
•• "The area around the proposed site of incineration. . . is a highly industrialized 
area (that already) has relatively high concentrations of air pollutants. The addition of 
combustion products from the incineration of over two million gallons of Orange herbi-
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Commission in February 1972 formally requested that the Agent 
Orange (which was stored at NCBC at Gulfport) "be removed 
from its location immediately."49 
Finally, in response to the persistent urging and the realization 
that many of the steel drums containing the Agent Orange were 
beginning to leak, the Air Force, in December 1974, filed a final 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) with the President's 
Council on Environmental Quality. They had made the decision 
to incinerate the remaining stocks aboard a specially designed 
Dutch incineration vessel, the "Vulcanis." This was to be done at 
sea, in a remote area west of Johnston Island. lIo EPA held public 
hearings in February 1975 in accordance with the Marine Protec-
tion, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as amended. III The 
EP A deferred approval at this time and instead requested the Air 
Force to further explore reprocessing as a means of disposition 
prior to making a final decision to incinerate. III The reprocessing 
was actively pursued and in February 1977 the Air Force con-
cluded that the reprocessing option was not feasible, timely or 
cost-effective because a technique for the ultimate disposal of the 
activated carbon by-product was not available or anticipated in 
the forseeable future. IS In March 1977 the Air Force requested 
reconvening of the EPA public hearings. Following these hear-
ings, the EPA ultimately issued a research permit to the Air 
Force and Ocean Combustion Services.1I4 
In the destruction of Agent Orange stocks, the agent was 
drained from the drums at each of the sites (Johnston Island in 
the Pacific and Gulfport, Mississippi) and was transferred to the 
cide into the atmosphere of this area over a prolonged period could compound an ex-
isting problem and might very well prove harmful," [emphasis added], quoted in 
WHITESIDE, supra note 34, at 20 . 
•• [d . 
•• USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-2. 
" 33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. "(a) Unregulated dumping of material into ocean waters 
endangers human health . . . and the marine environment, ecological systems . . . " 
and (b) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to regulate 
dumping. . . into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit dumping. . . any mate-
rial which would adversely affect human health. . . or the marine environment ... " 
•• Ocean dumping, receipt of application and tentative determination. U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. 40 Federal Register 13026-28, (1975) . 
•• USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6 . 
•• Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (Ocean Dumping) Research Per-
mit No. 770DHOOIR, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 
D.C., 15 p. (1977), cited USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-19. 
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Vulcanis. The empty drums were rinsed with diesel fuel and 
crushed. The rinse was then combined with the Agent Orange for 
incineration at sea. The operation was finally completed in Sep-
tember 1977, 16 years after its first military use. lUI 
To ensure environmental safety, various monitoring and sam-
pling programs were carried out in connection with the de-drum-
ming and incineration. The results of these sampling programs 
revealed that the levels of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T vapors were all below 
the Threshold Limit Value (TL V) for each of these materials. 16 
The congressionally directed studies to be done by NAS were 
conducted in South Vietnam during the period 1972-1973. The 
NAS committee spent about 1,500 man-days in South Vietnam 
during the course of the study. In a February 1974 report, NAS 
expressed concern over TCDD because of (1) its very high toxicity 
to animals, (2) its presence in Agent Orange, (3) preliminary re-
ports of the presence of TCDD in fish in Vietnam, and (4) the 
lack of any data permitting assessment of TCDD effects on 
humans.'7 As a result, the Academy recommended that long-term 
studies be made to obtain a firmer basis for assessing the poten-
tial harmful effects on man.18 The NAS committee could not 
gather any definitive indication of direct damage by herbicides to 
human health. The committee, however, was unable to visit the 
•• A total of 15,480 drums of Agent Orange were processed at the Mississippi site by 
approximately 110 USAF officers and technicians. A total of 24,795 drums were 
processed at Johnston Island by some 100 civilians hired by the contractor to perform 
the dedrumming process. At both sites, workers were provided with daily changes of 
work clothes and protective masks, hoods and clothes. The incineration was completed 
at sea during the period July to September 1977. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 
10, at CRS-7 . 
•• The noted levels were at least two and in most cases three orders of magnitude 
below the TL V's. TCDD was not detected in any air samples. Biomonitoring using 
rapidly growing tomato plants was used to confirm dispersal and diffusion downwind of 
the dedrumming and incineration sites. No adverse environmental impact resulted 
from these operations. USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at II-8, II-I0, 
II-15, II-18. 
07 Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam. 1974. Part A. Sum-
mary and Conclusions. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, Washington, D.C., 398 [herein-
after 1974 NAS Study], quoted in summary at USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, 
supra note 6, at V-17, and in General Accounting Office Community and Economic 
Development Division, CED-78-158 (08766) dated August 16, 1978, letter to Rep. 
Ralph H. Metcalfe, House of Representatives [hereinafter Metcalfe letter] at p. 5 and 
Enc!. III, at p. 7, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C .. 
• s "Further intensive studies are especially required with reference to the ecological 
distribution, the pharmacology mechanism of toxicity, possible mutagenicity, and carci-
nogenicity in man," [d. 
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Montagnards in their own locales to verify common and consis-
tent reports of serious illness and death, especially among chil-
dren, after exposure to herbicide sprays. liB 
With the increasing politicization of the herbicide issue world-
wide, even within South Vietnam itself, the NAS committee at-
tempted an assessment of the effects of the propagandistic activi-
ties on the attitudes of South Vietnamese towards the use of her-
bicides. They concluded that it had become a symbol among the 
urban intellectuals and was a lesser issue with the peasants.60 
VI. DIPLOMATIC IMPRINT OF THE MILITARY USE OF HERBICIDES 
In concert with the mounting concern and criticism within both 
the scientific community and the Congress as to the continued 
military use of herbicides (particularly Agent Orange), foreign 
criticism also mounted. Allegations against the United States 
with regard to "chemical warfare" in Vietnam were discussed as 
possible violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.61 [This Proto-
col was proposed at Geneva in 1925 by the United States as a ban 
on the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." It 
was first submitted to the Senate for ratification in 1926, but was 
never ratified]. 62 
The United States' position has consistently been that the use 
of herbicides in war is not prohibited by the Geneva ProtocoL68 
•• Id. at Encl. III at p. 7. 
•• "Our findings indicate that there is a major dichotomy between the views of the 
rural population and those of the urban middle-sector regarding the use of herbicides 
in SVN. Contrary to what might be expected, the herbicide missions are much less an 
emotional issue among the peasants, who bore the brunt of the effects, than it is among 
the urban intellectuals for whom it has become a symbol." 1974 NAS Study, supra, 
portion quoted in USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at V-30 . 
•• "Internationally, the United States has provoked mistrust and criticism. Countries 
of the world have spoken out against the United States' use of chemical warfare in 
Vietnam, declaring that it is immoral, inhuman, in violation of the provisions of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925, and [is] contrary to customary international practice which 
has developed as a result of the Protocol." Goodell, Targets for Further Disarmament, 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES POLICY PAPER SERIES No.2, 'CIS No.4 at 6 (1969). 
Quoted in McCullough, supra note 11, at 29 . 
•• Presidential Document: Ford, Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 73-74 (1975), Of-
fice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, GSA, Washington, 
D.C. 20408 [hereinafter President Ford's remarks re Geneva Protocol] . 
• a House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Chemical-Biological Warfare: u.S. Policies 
and International Effects. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments. (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1970) p. 231 
(91st Cong., 1st Sess.) November 18, 20; December 2, 9, 18 and 19, 1969 [hereinafter 
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This was the position taken by Secretary of State Rogers and by 
President Nixon in their letter of [re]transmittal of the Protocol 
to the Senate in August 1970 for its advice and consent to 
ratification.64 
Illustrative of the contrary view taken by many others in the 
international community, was the adoption of a Swedish resolu-
tion in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1969 
(by a vote of 80 to 3) which: "stipulated that it was contrary to 
the 'generally recognized rules of international law', as embodied 
in the Geneva Protocol, to use in international conflicts 'any 
chemical agents of warfare' phrasing which was intended to cover 
tear gas and other non-lethal chemicals as well as herbicides."8G 
There are many arguments and analyses on whether herbicides 
(antiplant compounds) were to be included within the scope of 
the Geneva Protocol. Most analyses of this issue center around 
the fact that herbicides had not been discovered in 1925 when the 
Protocol was written.88 
Following the resubmission of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to 
the Senate in August of 1970 by President Nixon, extensive con-
gressional hearings were conducted in 1971, during which differ-
ing views developed. At this same time the executive branch (and 
in particular the Departments of State and Defense as well as 
Justice) undertook a thorough and comprehensive review of the 
military, legal and political issues relating to the Protocol. Follow-
ing the passage of the presidential office to Gerald R. Ford, Presi-
dent Ford announced on January 22,1975 a new policy to govern 
any future use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbi-
cides.87 On that date President Ford signed the instruments of 
House Chemical Warfare Hearings] at p. 224 . 
.. President Nixon's Letters of Transmittal on the Protocol for Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Other Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, (to the Senate of the United States), August 19, 1970. 
"It is the United States' understanding of the Protocol that it does not prohibit the 
use in war of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides. Smoke, flame and napalm are 
also not covered by the Protocol." Department of State, Letter of Submittal [Of the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925] to the President, (August 11, 1970) . 
•• House Committee on Foreign Affairs, supra note 63, at 24 
[The United States, Australia and Portugal were the only nations voting against this 
resolution, although there were 36 abstentions] . 
.. See for example: A.G. THOMAS, ANN VAN WYNEN et al. LEGAL LIMITS ON THE USE 
OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. (1970); and Goldblat, Are Tear Gas and Herbi-
cides Permitted Weapons?, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, April 1970, at 13-16. 
•• Supra note 62, at p. 74. 
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ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological 
Weapons Convention, to which the Senate had given its advice 
and consent on December 16, 1974.68 The new policy was a renun-
ciation of: "the first-use of herbicides in war except use, under 
regulations, applicable to their domestic use, for control of vege-
tation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immedi-
ate defensive perimeters." 
This was set forth in an Executive Order,69 which in addition, 
reaffirmed United States policy (established in 1971), that "any 
use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents must be 
approved by me [the President] in advance."7o 
From this review of the United States foreign policy with re-
spect to the use of herbiddes for military operations, one can see 
what some might characterize as a "responsive adjustment" as 
the body of scientific evidence grew on the possible toxic effects 
of our military herbicides (specifically 2,4,5-T and dioxin). During 
this same time similar reassessments were going on with respect 
to its domestic and civilian uses. 
VII. CIVILIAN USAGE AND EVENTUAL CURTAILMENT 
As discussed supra, the civilian usage and eventual curtailment 
of 2,4,5-T is beyond the full scope of this article. An overview, 
however, to show the similarities in resistance to curtailment is 
necessary in order to place the Agent Orange problems in appro-
priate perspective. 
The herbicide 2,4,5-T has been produced as a "registered pesti-
cide" in the United States since 1948. EPA records show approxi-
mately 122 companies hold Federal registrations and formulate 
424 registered products;71 eleven additional companies have for-
mer state registration72 and formulate 21 products. To provide 
some insight as to the magnitude of the civilian usage within the 
United States, the Department of Agriculture's official Pesticide 
•• [d. and for Senate advice and consent, see: 120 Congressional Record 39579-41020 
(December 16, 1974) (The Geneva Protocol of 1925) . 
•• Executive Order 11850. Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbi-
cides and Riot Control Agents, April 8, 1975. Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 
1975. WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. Doc., Vol. II-I. Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Record Service, GSA, Washington, D.C. at p. 350. 7. Ford, supra note 62, at 74. 
71 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 29, at 17118. 
72 [d. at 17118 n.3. See 40 C.F.R. 162.17(a). 
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Review reported that 11.6 million pounds of 2,4,5-T acids, esters 
and salts were produced in the United States in 1969 and 12.3 
million pounds in 1970. During the period 1971-1974 some 0.7 
million pounds were imported.78 Principal domestic use in 1974, 
as an example of the panoply of types of utilization, was as fol-
lows: (1) weed control on rights-of-way: 4 million pounds; (2) 
range land and pastures: 1.5 to 2.3 million pounds; (3) rice crops: 
220,000 pounds; and (4) forestry: 50,000 pounds.7" 
Since 1950 most of the chemical industry has known that large 
quantities of TCDD may be formed as a byproduct of the 2,4,5-T 
manufacturing process if the manufacturing procedures were not 
carefully controlled. At one time, 2,4,5-T was produced which 
contained between 30-40 ppm of TCDD. Between 1968 and 1969, 
one manufacturer had a 90 percent decrease in TCDD present in 
the 2,4,5-T that it produced. After concern arose in 1969 about 
the extremely toxic effects of TCDD, manufacturing methods 
were changed and carefully controlled. By 1971 industry had re-
duced TCDD content in commercial samples to less than 1 ppm. 
Current U.S. manufacturing specifications require 2,4,5-T pres-
ently being sold to contain less than 0.1 ppm. Several foreign 
countries now produce commercial 2,4,5-T containing less than 
0.05 ppm of TCDD.76 
Herbicide 2,4,5-T has been the subject of a number of Federal 
regulatory actions following its first registration in March 1948. 
Initially, regulation of 2,4,5-T came under the aegis of the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Subsequently this 
function was transferred to EPA. On April 13, 1966 USDA and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jointly announced in 
the Federal Register the abolishment of the "no residue and zero 
tolerance" concepts [of drug and chemical registration] as scien-
tifically unattainable. Future registrations were to be granted on 
the basis of either "Negligible Residue" or "Permissible Residue." 
Industry was given until December 31, 1967 to comply by ob-
taining tolerances for residues of 2,4,5-T in all treated food, feed 
•• u.s. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVA-
TION SERVICE. 1976. The Pesticide Review 1975, quoted in U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, supra note 29 . 
•• [d. at 17119 . 
•• [d. The average TCDD levels in Agent Orange used in South Vietnam was 2 ppm 
(96% of all herbicide used was Agent Orange) and approximately 32.8 ppm of Agent 
Purple and 65.6 ppm in Agents Pink and Green (comprising the remaining 4% of her-
bicides used), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-2. 
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products and byproducts.78 Following this announcement, a series 
of Pesticide Registration (PR) notices were issued over the next 
several years, extending certain "no residue" and "zero tolerance" 
registrations for uses of· 2,4,5-T on pasture grasses and rangeland, 
apples, blueberries, cereal grains, rice, sugarcane, and in lakes and 
ponds.77 Subsequent PR Notices identified 2,4,5-T compounds as 
requiring further teratogenic studies.78 PR's 70-11 and 70-13, is-
sued in April and May of 1970, however, suspended 2,4,5-T prod-
ucts from certain uses (e.g. on lakes, ponds or ditch banks and 
around the home and recreation sites),78 but PR 70-13 issued on 
May 1, 1970 cancelled (among other uses) all2,4,5-T uses on food 
crops intended for human consumption.80 
With these last PR cancellations of registrations for 2,4,5-T 
food crop use, two of the registrants (who were two of the largest 
manufacturers of 2,4,5-T in the United States) Dow Chemical and 
Hercules Incorporated, exercised their rights under section 4(e) of 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)81 
by petitioning for referral of the cancellation to an Advisory Com-
mittee of scientists to review all relevant facts.81 The Advisory 
Committee met and submitted their report to the Administrator 
of EPA in May 1971, recommending: 
permitted use of 2,4,5-T in forestry, range land and rights-of-way pro-
viding that the limit of 0.1 ppm contamination with TeDD be set for 
all future production of 2,4,5-T; that all 2,4,5-T be applied no more 
than once a year at anyone site; and that 2,4,5-T be applied with 
proper caution so that it will not contaminate other areas where it 
may come into contact with humans.la 
Shortly thereafter, USDA published PR Notice 70-22 on Sep-
tember 28, 1970 advising of the presence of chlorodioxin contami-
nants (such as TCDD) in economic poisons (including herbicides 
78 u.s. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 29, at 17124 . 
•• ld. 
•• An agent or chemical is considered teratogenic when it causes development distur-
bances in the embryo resulting in congenital malformations. GAO Request 1979, supra 
note 11, at 20., USDA. 1970. PR Notice 70-8. Looseleaf pub. 1, p . 
•• USDA. 1970. PR Notice 70-10. Looseleaf pub. 2 pp .. 
•• USDA. 1970. PR Notice 70-13. Looseleaf pub. 2 pp (emphasis added) . 
• , 7 USC § 135 et seq. [hereinafter FIFRA] . 
•• Sec. 4(c) of FIFRA (1964 amendment) provides for a nine-member committee of 
scientists to consider all relevant facts, submit a report and recommendations regard-
ing registration (or continuation). (Explained in EPA supra note 29, at 17124) . 
•• ld. at 17124, 17144 n.48. 
1979] AGENT ORANGE 177 
and pesticides). It stated further, that such contaminants in 2,4,5-
T constituted a possible hazard to man since they had been found 
to be extremely toxic to laboratory animals. This PR advised that 
appropriate regulatory action would be taken under FIFRA since 
products containing chlorodioxins were considered to be "in viola-
tion of FIFRA. "S. Dow moved to protect one of its major markets 
- rice. They filed for injunctive relief in the District Court in 
Arkansas (an area heavily involved in rice crop production). They 
obtained injunctive relief against EPA in the United States Dis-
trict Court in Arkansas in July 1972, enjoining further adminis-
trative action against 2,4,5-T. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit overturned this injunction in April 
1973,slI and EPA proceeded with formal cancellation hearings to 
remove the herbicide from the market. [Dow was not the com-
plete loser in this action: they were successful in gaining nearly 
two years of delay in the suspension by their appeal]. 
Extensive public hearings were held during 1974 on all uses of 
2,4,5-T including insecticides as well as herbicides containing 
2,4,5-T. In June 1974, EPA decided that it would "continue its 
TCDD residue monitoring" since it didn't have sufficient hard ev-
idence that was needed to rebut the herbicide manufacturers and 
users (farm groups), and [to the shock of environmental groups] 
withdrew the proceedings.se Although the 2,4,5-T Notice of Hear-
ing was withdrawn, EPA advised that it would continue its 
TCDD residue monitoring and that it will take such further ac-
tion as it deems appropriate once the results of the monitoring 
projects were available. S7 EPA continued its review of 2,4,5-T in a 
B. USDA. 1970. PR Notice 70-22. Looseleaf pub. 1 p., and see EPA RPAR on 2,4,5,-
T, supra note 29, at 17124. 
B' Dow Chemical Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1973). 
B. EPA, supra note 29, at 17124. (EPA Administrator for Toxic Substances, Steven 
Jellinek explained: "While laboratory studies have demonstrated that even such min-
ute quantities of dioxin [as those present in the environment) could produce oncogenic, 
teratogenic and other reproductive effects in animals ... the exposure link between 
the use of 2,4,5-T and these effects in human beings could not be demonstrated. The 
inability to generate reliable data relating to 2,4,5-T use to a measurable presence of 
dioxin made it difficult to determine whether the risks associated with the compounds' 
use were unreasonable, and EPA therefore withdrew the proceedings." June 1979 Con-
gressional Hearings before House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations, quoted in Human Disease Linked to Dioxin: Congress Calls for 
2,4,5-T Ban After Dramatic Herbicide Hearings, BIOSCIENCE VOL. 28, No.8, August 
1979, at 454 [hereinafter Dioxin Linked). 
87 39 C.F.R. 24050. (June 28, 1974). 
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series of studies and conferences. They established a Dioxin Im-
plementation Plan (DIP) which was intended to identify the pref-
erable; analytical methodology for the monitoring of human and 
environmental samples for TCDD.88 
During this time (1974-1979) the results of several TCDD "inci-
dents" began to develop and corroborate, in an ominous manner, 
the dangerous toxicity to humans and animals of TCDD. In Au-
gust 1972, in a horse arena in Eastern Missouri, 57 horses died 
shortly after exposure to arena turf that had been oil-treated. The 
cause of death was an illness characterized by skin lesions, severe 
weight loss and heptotoxicity. Birds, dogs, cats, insects and ro-
dents were also found dead in and around the arena. One six-year 
old girl exposed developed epstaxis, gastrointestinal complaints, 
and severe hemorrhagic systitis (characterized by blood in the 
urine). Subsequent studies and investigations determined that 
the arena had been treated with surplus oil sludge that had been 
contaminated with TCDD (31-33.8 ppm).89 
An explosion in a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy (near Milan) 
in July of 1976 exposed some 2,000 persons to TCDD as a toxic 
cloud drifted across approximately 5 km. x 700 m. of Italian coun-
tryside. Animals began to die two to three days after the incident 
with 1,100 animals killed by direct exposure to TCDD. A total of 
37 cases of chloracne (skin lesions) were reported (primarily in 
children). Additional health data have been collected but have 
not been analyzed to the point that any conclusions can be drawn 
about the chronic effects of human exposure to TCDD. The data 
being developed as a result of the Seve so incident are quite con-
troversial. Some scientists claim that there is a lack of reliable 
background data for the exposed area which will make evalua-
tions difficult. 90 
The most recent incident occurred in the late 1970's in the 
mountainous area surrounding Alsea, Oregon. The women of Al-
sea, located near a National Forest which was heavily sprayed 
with 2,4,5-T, were experiencing miscarriages, complications of 
pregnancy, and delivery of malformed babies at a rate more than 
three times the rate that would be expected in a comparable pop-
•• EPA supra note 29, at 17124 . 
•• USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at V-17, V-IS; EPA, supra note 
29, at 17123 . 
• 0 See for example CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-4; WHITESIDE, 
supra note 34, at 65-130; USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at V-21. 
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ulation.91 The epidemiological study that followed confirmed: "a 
statistically higher incidence of spontaneous abortions (miscar-
riages) than women living in comparable [urban or rural] control 
areas where there is no known use of 2,4,5-T . . . a significant 
correlation between the amounts of 2,4,5-T used in the study area 
during the spraying season and the subsequent increase in the 
spontaneous abortion index in the study area .... "92 
The Alsea study has been cited as showing the first correlation 
between 2,4,5-T (and presumably its TCDD contaminant) and 
teratogenic effects in humans.93 
With the evidence mounting, EPA on April 21, 1978 issued its 
Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration (RPAR) of pesti-
cide products containing 2,4,5-T for certain uses. The Adminis-
trator, after weighing the risks and benefits as per 40 CFR § 
162.11 for FIFRA determined that a: "rebuttable presumption ex-
ists against registration and continued registration of all pesticide 
products containing 2,4,5-T."94 
The administrator found that all registrations for 2,4,5-T pesti-
cide products containing 2,4,5-T and/or TCDD met or exceeded 
the level of risk of acute and chronic toxicity that EPA estab-
lished for pesticides (under 40 CFR § 162.11(a) (3» for terato-
genic and/or fetotoxic effects, raising a rebuttable presumption 
against new or continued registration of such products [for for-
estry, rights-of-way and pasture uses]. He further found insuffi-
cient data and analyses available with respect to mutagenic ef-
fects in test animals and toxic effects on humans, to issue the 
rebuttable presumption with respect to those effects (but did in-
dicate further and continued research for those areas).911 Request 
was made for any scientific material with respect to all aspects of 
2,4,5-T. Within ten months EPA had assembled sufficient data to 
., Dioxin Linked, supra note 86, at 453; Environmental Protection Agency. Decision 
and Emergency Order Suspending Registrations for the Forest, Rights-of-Way, and 
Pasture Uses on 2,4,5-T. March 8, 1979 pp. 15874-15894 [hereinafter EPA Emergency 
Suspension] at p. 15876; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-4 . 
•• Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 91, at 15876 . 
•• CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-4 . 
•• EPA, supra note 29, at 17116 . 
•• Id. at 17116-17117. Note that the burden of proof was shifted from the govern-
ment (to prove why registration should not be continued or granted) to the manufac-
turer (to prove the safety of his product). This was done by the 1964 amendment to 
FIFRA. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) [hereinafter EDF v. Ruckelshaus]. 
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make its decision: emergency suspension for "forestry, rights-of-
way, and pasture uses." The most persuasive additional data 
flowed from the epidemiological studies of the Alsea, Oregon inci-
dents. EPA concluded: 
"the use of 2,4,5-T over a six-year period in the Alsea area was re-
lated to a statistically significant increase in the frequency of miscar-
riages by women residents of the area, and that these miscarriages 
occurred shortly after the use of 2,4,5-T in the area where the women 
lived."98 
These emergency suspensions were carried out under FIFRA 
Section 6(c). The "emergency" was considered to exist because 
the EPA Administrator decided that "there was not enough time 
to complete a suspension hearing before the next spraying 
season. "97 
From this overview, one can see the similar paths between the 
military and civilian use of 2,4,5-T (and its associated dioxin): ini-
tial unbridled use, followed by some restriction as the evidence 
mounted, ending with complete suspension for all military uses 
and for many of the major civilian uses. 
VIII. VETERANS' COMPLAINTS OF RESPONSES TO AGENT ORANGE 
EXPOSURE 
The first reports of veterans' concerns over possible health ef-
fects of exposure to 2,4,5-T/dioxin began to trickle in in late 1977. 
The Veterans Administration (VA) began receiving herbicide-re-
lated compensation claims at this time,9S and increasing numbers 
.. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 91, at 15874. 
07 [d. The Administrator's definition and interpretation of "emergency" and "immi-
nent hazard to,the public" had previously been given judicial sanction by Chief Judge 
Bazelon who held such definitions to be "consistent with the statutory [FIFRA] lan-
guage," EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971). When a pesticide re-
gistration is suspended, the sale of the compound in interstate commerce is halted 
immediately. When the intent to cancel registration is announced, the sale and use of 
the compound can continue pending review of the announcement as published in the 
Federal Register and appeals may further extend the cancellation date. The EPA may 
suspend a registration when, in the opinion of the experts, an immediate and/or immi-
nent hazard in the registered use is involved. See McCullough, supra note 11, at 17 and 
McCarey, Pesticide Regulation. Risk Assessment and Burden of Proof, 45 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1066, 1081 (1977). 
O. Comptroller General, U.S. Ground Troops in South Vietnam Were in Areas 
Sprayed With Herbicide Orange, GAO REPORT FPCD-80-23, November 16, 1979, 
[hereinafter GAO Reports Troops Sprayed) at p. 2. (As of September 30, 1979, 750 
persons had submitted claims but about 4,800 persons had requested treatment for 
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came forward in 1978 and 1979. Of the 450 claimants, some 255 of 
the veteran's complaints were generated in the Chicago area by 
the airing in March 1978 by Chicago CBS-affiliate WBBM of a 
one-hour television special: "Agent Orange: Vietnam's Deadly 
Fog. "99 The VA is primarily concerned with the question of 
whether the herbicides used in South Vietnam could be affecting 
the veterans' health at the present time. The VA feels that news 
media reports as to the latent effects have precipitated a great 
deal of the concern by the veterans (as in Chicago). The news 
stories have mentioned health problems including: hand tremors, 
weight loss, diminished sexual drive, cancer, birth defects in off-
spring, a skin condition called chloracne, liver damage and psy-
chological problems.loo As the veterans have actually come into 
the VA facilities they have added other complaints: respiratory 
problems, numbness in extremities, gastrointestinal tract distur-
bances and vision and/or hearing impairments.lol Following initial 
complaints of inept and inappropriate treatment at VA hospi-
talsl02 and complaints to Congressmen, the VA began immediate 
investigations on its own and the Subcommittee on Medical Fa-
cilities and Benefits of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs began 
its hearings. loa The VA's research confirmed the animal studies 
showing the impact of the highly toxic TCDD on laboratory ani-
mals: tissue edema; liver necrosis; gastric mucosal hypetrophy; 
gastrointestinal erosion; thymic and lymphatic atrophy. In addi-
tion the VA confirmed fetal toxicity, teratogenesis and tumor pro-
duction reports from animal tests.10• 
VA testimony by Dr. Paul Haber, Assistant Chief Medical Di-
rector, highlighted the internal steps taken by the VA to evaluate 
the possible causes and effects of Agent Orange exposure. The 
VA's position at the time of testimony on October 11, 1978 (after 
herbicide-related claims. Id. at 3 . 
.. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-S. Of the 450 claims as of Sep-
tember 1975, 255 of these claims were filed in the Chicago area following the WBBM 
CBS TV special Veterans Administration: Agent Orange and Vietnam Veterans (20 
typical questions asked of the V A with answers about Agent Orange received by the 
Veterans Administration). VA INFORMATION SERVICE No. 063 dated 2-21-79. 6 p. V.A., 
Washington, D.C. 20420 [hereinafter VA Questions and Answers] at pp. 1-2. 
lo0Id. 
101 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 10, at CRS-S. 
101 Agent Orange Furor Continues to Build, SCIENCE, VOL. 205, 24 August 1979, 770, 
771 [hereinafter Orange Furor] . 
.. 8 Veterans Hearings, supra note 17 and GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 1. 
104 Id. Veterans Hearings, supra note 17 at 23. 
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review of the human studies of industrial, agricultural and rail-
road workers who used herbicides, and epidemiological studies 
following industrial accidents in both Europe and the United 
States, as well as reports from Vietnamese citizens exposed to 
2,4,5-T and dioxin) was: 
The only human disorder which can definitely be linked to herbicide 
exposure is chloracne. The lesion may heal completely or result in 
scar tissue. Temporary symptoms can be produced after heavy expo-
sure, including nausea, diarrhea, fatigue, anorexia, headaches, back-
aches, cutaneous sensory deficiency, impaired olfactory or gustatory 
sensation, tremors, and temporary focal muscle paralysis. These 
symptoms disappeared after a short period of time. loa 
The V A then began a series of administrative actions directed 
specifically toward the Agent Orange problems. First, the V A is-
sued guidelines for its health care facilities and regional offices on 
how to handle veteran complaints on Agent Orange exposure. It 
then initiated internal studies, and it established three commit-
tees to work on the herbicide problems. An internal Steering 
Committee has been meeting since June 1978 to provide in-house 
internal guidance for both medical and administrative V A person-
nel. Assisting this committee is an interagency group known as 
the Interagency Committee on Herbicides. It functions as a 
factfinding advisory group and was developed to explore potential 
adverse health effects of defoliants, including symptomotology, 
methods for diagnosis and treatment, and approaches through 
which the V A might discover the adverse effects of defoliants 
used in South Vietnam on its patient population.108 Formation of 
a V A Advisory Committee on Health Related Effects of Herbi-
cides was announced in June of 1979. This Committee is com-
posed of 15 members from the scientific community, the academic 
community and from government. It will assist the V A in moni-
toring the V A's continuing inquiry into the possible health effects 
of Agent Orange and resulting V A claims activities.107 
I., [d. 
,.8 GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 10. 
I •• VETERANS ADMINISTRATION NEWS RELEASE: Establishment of V A Advisory Com-
mittee on Health Related Effects of Herbicides Announced by Max Cleland, Adminis-
trator of Veterans Affairs, June 8,1970, VA, Washington, D.C. 20420. 
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A.) V A Dioxin in Body Fat Study 
One of the main medical concerns was to determine the persis-
tence in body tissue of TCDD for protracted periods of time. The 
V A decided to conduct a brief, controlled investigation of 20 age 
and service-matched veterans, ten being individuals who had un-
questionable exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnam war 
and ten being veterans who have not knowingly had any exposure 
to this agent during their military service.108 Preliminary results 
of this small-scale epidemiological study were announced on De-
cember 12, 1979 by VA Dr. Lyndon E. Lee. Dr. Lee said that fat 
tissues had been taken from 33 men, including a control group 
who had not served in Vietnam. Results of these body-fat tissue 
studies showed that 22 of the 33 samples had been analyzed and 
dioxin was found in 10 of them. The amounts ranged from three 
to 57 parts per trillion, amounts so minute that ordinary test 
methods would not have detected them.loe 
In January 1978, a joint National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (NIEHS)/International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (IARC) ad hoc working group was convened to consider 
the feasibility of coordinating epidemiological studies on the long-
term health hazards associated with dioxin compounds and cer-
tain other structurally related compounds (e.g. polychlorinated 
dibenzofurans).1l0 
B.) Defense Department Actions 
In contrast to the increased and seemingly responsive reactions 
,.. The objectives of this study were threefold: (1) to determine whether dioxin does 
persist in body fat for as long as 8-10 years, at levels of concentration capable of instru-
mental indentification, e.g., 1 ppt, (2) to discover whether persons who have never been 
exposed to Agent Orange also carry in their body fat dioxin or other chemicals which . 
can't be differentiated from dioxin by currently available lab methods and (3) to corre-
late symptoms and levels of exposure with amounts of dioxin found in fat after 8 to 10 
years. 
'08 Associated Press. Washington, D.C., December 12, 1979. Traces of Toxic Chemi-
cal Found in Vietnam Veterans N.Y. TIMES, December 13, 1979, A:18:1. 
". GAO REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 25. The NIEHS/IARC working group 
noted in its June 1978 report the need for (1) better coordination of ongoing and pro-
jected epidemiological efforts and (2) a worldwide action plan for harmonizing the vari-
ous research activities already in progress or in preparatory stages. This should include 
(3) a system for international exchanges of information and research; development of 
common protocols for clinical examinations and design of a protocol for basic core in-
formation; and development of an international registry of exposed persons to serve as 
a basis for long-term followup. [d. 
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within most of the executive and legislative agencies described 
above (e.g. EPA, USDA, VA, NIEHS, IARC, HEW, GAO etc.), 
the Departm~nt of Defense was continuing to maintain its posi-
tion that it did not know what the long-term effects of large acute 
doses of TCDD or small intermittent or chronic exposures 
were. 111 It asserted that: 
The handling, transport and storage procedures employed for the her-
bicide generally precluded physical contact with the herbicides by 
most military personnel assigned to Operation Ranch Hand . . . The 
methods employed in spraying herbicides and the geographical areas 
designated for dissemination of the herbicides generally precluded 
direct physical contact with the herbicide by military personnel as-
signed to other programs. 111 
The GAO, as the investigatory arm of the Congress, did not 
accept the above conclusions.u8 But Defense doubted that a ret-
rospective epidemiological study would produce reliable results 
because of the 17 -year lapse from the beginning of the herbicide 
operations and the general lack of data on exposure concentra-
tions and times, and concluded that identification of an appropri-
ate control group would be "virtually impossible." Despite these 
doubts, GAO urged Defense to conduct such a study.u4 Presently 
such a study of the Air Force personnel involved in Operation 
Ranch Hand is now in the protocol planning stage (by the NAS 
111 Id. See also USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REpORT, supra note 6, at pp. VI-29, V-30. 
In summary, the USAF Report concluded: 
(1). If there is not a history of chloracne, it is highly unlikely that systemic changes 
will be due to TCDD. 
(2). The presence of active chloracne months to years after exposure does not nec-
essarily mean continuing exposure. 
(3). Skin lesions of porphria cutanea tarda are independent of those associated with 
chloracne. 
(4). The development of porphria cutanea tarda following exposure to TCDD sug-
gests an adverse liver response to the TCDD . . . 
(7). Claims of carcinogesis, teratogenesis, and mutagenesis in man have not been 
confirmed at this time for the phenoxy herbicides or TCDD. However the topic re-
mains open ... 
(9). The long-term effects of large acute doses of TCDD or small intermittent or 
chronic exposures are not known. Id. 
111 USAF HERBICIDE ORANGE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-31 (emphasis added). 
lIS The Department of Defense, with the assistance and guidance of an appropriate in-
teragency group, should conduct a survey of any long-term medical effects on military 
personnel who were likely to have been exposed to herbicides in South Vietnam. GAO 
REQUEST 1979, supra note 11, at 27. 
114 Id. at 27. 
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and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the Armed 
Forces Epidemiological Board).lUI By use of computer tapes 
(known as the "HERBS TAPES" - computer tapes containing 
data on the date, number of planes, amount of herbicide dropped, 
and the location for approximately 86 percent of all herbicide 
missions in South Vietnam), the GAO was able to compare this 
data base with daily troop locations and strengths and estimate 
the number and proximity of troops to herbicide missions (how-
ever, actual exposure could not be documented from available 
records).118 Unfortunately, "Army records from the Vietnam con-
flict are neither complete nor well organized. This results from 
the Army's rapid pullout from Vietnam."1l7 In contrast, "Monthly 
Marine Corps battalion reports contained detailed information on 
location, strength, and personnel turnover necessary to develop a 
data base to compare with the herbicide orange spraying missions 
[GAO] compared ground troop locations with herbicide orange 
missions [and] estimate that about 5,900 Marines were assigned 
within 0.5 km. of areas sprayed with herbicide orange on the same 
day . . . the number of Marines within 0.5 km. of the sprayed 
areas before the four-week reentry period which DOD established 
was about 16,100 .... "118 [N.B. These GAO conclusions are -
justifiably - extremely critical of the gross underestimates of the 
Department of Defense and the USAF (in its 1978 Report) as to 
the number of military personnel potentially exposed to Herbi-
cide Orange (i.e. some "few" of 1,200 Operation Ranch Hand Per-
sonnel (DOD) vs. virtually all of 16,100! (GAO». One cannot help 
but view the 1978 Air Force Study in a far more critical light in 
view of these GAO findings]. 
IX. RELIEF FOR AFFECTED AGENT ORANGE VETERANS 
A.) Possible Legislative Action 
Possible legislative assistance to potential Agent Orange victims 
was recently announced in October 1979 by a bipartisan congres-
sional group from the 96th Congress. This group urged broader 
assistance in health care benefits (among other aids) to Vietnam 
110 This protocol planning stage was expected to be completed in January 1980. GAO 
Reports Troops Sprayed, supra note 98, at 3. 
118 [d. at p. 5. 
11. [d. 
118 [d. at p. 8. 
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veterans. The bill urges compensation to Vietnam veterans and 
their families who suffered health problems after exposure to 
Agent Orang~. 118 In addition, several bills have been introduced 
in the 96th Congress (1st Session) which were to extend and re-
vise a program of grants to State homes for veterans and to ex-
tend and expand a program of exchanges of medical information. 
Somewhat companion bills (S.1039 and H.R. 3892) have begun 
the hearing process with their respective Committees on Veter-
ans' Affairs.llIO 
B.J Litigatory Response to Agent Orange 
Two lawsuits have been filed on behalf of the alleged Agent Or-
ange victims, both in United States District Courts, but each 
seeking differing types of relief: a private class action suit for 
damages against the manufacturers of 2,4,5-T in products liabil-
ity; the other, a public interest class action suit for injunctive re-
lief to force the V A to go through a formal public rule-making 
procedure regarding its policies governing claimants for Agent Or-
ange disability. III 
1.) Private Damage Suit, District Court, Eastern District of New 
York 
The first suit filed in the Eastern District of New York was 
filed by Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., a longtime environmental law-
yer. As co-founder of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
Yannacone earlier led the fight against DDT in the late 1960's 
and defined many of the basic concepts of environmental law. 111 
The suit, initially with plaintiff Paul Reutersham (since deceased 
from cancer), was filed against the major manufacturers of 2,4,5-T 
in the United States: Dow Chemical; Hercules Incorporated; Dia-
mond Shamrock Corporation; Monsanto Company and Thomp-
son-Hayward Chemical Company.1lII8 The action was brought as a 
110 Weintraub, B., New Bill Would Aid Vietnam Veterans: Major Bipartisan Push is 
Planned for Comprehensive Measure Being Likened to G.I. Bill [WWII1, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 1979, A9 coLI. 
, •• S. 1039 and H.R. 3892 (Calendar No. 219) of 96th Congress, 1st Session, Clerk of the 
House and Clerk of the Senate, United States Congress, Washington, D.C .. 
,., Orange Furor, supra note 102, at 770 . 
.. I Payne, K.J., Beyond Vietnam, Beyond Politics, Beyond Causes, BARRISTER, YOUNG 
LAWYERS DIVISION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Chicago, lllinois, Spring 1979, 11, 12. 
"8 ReutershanI v. Dow Chemical (D.C. E.D. N.Y., 1979) (Docket No. 79C 1195) subse-
quently recaptioned: IN RE "AGENT ORANGE," Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) No. 38 
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class action on behalf of the veterans, their wives, children and 
parents and has now become consolidated with a number of other 
similar class action cases filed across the country to become a 
multi-district litigation case titled: "Agent Orange Product Lia-
bility Litigation. "124 The suit attempted to invoke statutory 
causes of action under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA), the Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act (FEPCA), the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TOSCA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).lII Prod-
uct liability (inherently dangerous product) causes include: strict 
liability; negligence and breach of warranty; intentional tort; and 
in addition requests equitable relief, with a cause in nuisance and 
for declaratory judgment. In sum the suit asks for: 
1. An immediate ban on all advertising, promotion, distribution, 
marketing and sale of the contaminated herbicides; 
2. A declaration that the corporate defendants are trustees of the 
public health and safety and welfare with a fiduciary responsibil-
ity to the public; 
3. A disclosure of everything [that] the companies knew about the 
dangers of the contaminated herbicides; and 
4. Establishment by the [defendant] companies of a tax-exempt re-
serve fund sufficient to cover damages from the use of the herbi-
cides (to reimburse the VA and the Social Security Administra-
tion for benefits, compensate victims and their families and 
protect consumers from any attempt to pass along the cost of 
damages from resulting use of utility and railroad rights of 
way). 118 
This Agent Orange litigation may be expected to be innovative 
in several respects: (1) the establishment of a federal common law 
for negligence and product liability (2) denial of any "private" 
cause of action from the toxic chemical statutes (3) establishment 
of a trust fund for the class recovery (4) extension of the tort 
recovery under "enterprise liability" and, (5) the unique argu-
(1979) [hereinafter In Re "Agent Orange") (See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation). 
,.4 Id. 
". FIFRA - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 135 et 
seq.FEPCA - Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. 135 et seq.TOSCA -
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.CPSA - The Consumer Product 
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq. 
"8 In re "Agent Orange", supra in Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint, at 
18-22. 
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ment for the establishment of a class "at risk." (This class would 
consist of living veterans without [current] symptoms, but at risk 
of genetic an~ somatic damage).127 
a). Establishment of "Federal Common Law" for Negligence/ 
Product Liability 
Of major significance to the practice of negligence and product 
liability law in the federal courts is the establishment of a "fed-
eral common law. "lIB The plaintiffs argued successfully that the 
corporate defendants (Dow et al) have allegedly violated the 
"common law ... of the United States ... ,." Judge George C. 
Pratt, the Agent Orange trial judge in the Eastern District of New 
York held that the litigation affects substantial federal interest 
and that federal common law must be applied. The Court, using 
Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) and Wallis v. Pan 
American Petroleum Corporation, 384 U.S. 63 (1966), synthe-
sized the three factors crucial to the applicability of federal com-
mon law under any test: "(1) the existence of a substantial federal 
interest in the outcome of the litigation; (2) the effect on this fed-
eral interest should state law be applied; and (3) the effect on 
state interests should state law be displaced by federal common 
law. 129 
i) Substantial Federal Interest. 
The Court found a substantial federal interest in soldiers serv-
ing in the armed forces, finding them to be "government 
charges", entitled to government protection. Further, torts com-
mitted by war contractors against soldiers in action constituted 
"harms inflicted" on the soldiers and "interference" with the rela-
tionship between soldiers and the government, citing United 
States v. Standard Oil. ISO The Court struck down the defendant's 
117 [d, at 5, This "class" would include those veterans who served in South Vietnam and 
who were exposed to Agent Orange, yet do not presently evidence symptoms of dioxin-
related medical problems, 
.. 8 Decision of Judge George C. Pratt, (E.D.N.Y., MDL No. 381, November 20, 1979) 
[hereinafter District Court Finding of Federal Common Lawl, at p. 12 . 
.. 0 [d. at p. 17. 
180 332 U.S. 301, 305-306 (1947). 
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively federal 
in character than that between it and members of its armed forces. To whatever extent 
state law may apply . . . the scope, nature, legal incidence and consequence of the 
relation between persons in service and the government are fundamentally derived 
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argument that VA benefits lSI provided adequate federal protec-
tion to veterans injured in active service, discounting the limited 
monthly benefits which may not fully compensate and the fact 
that 38 USC § 310 et seq. provided no compensation to veterans' 
spouses or their children who have allegedly suffered genetic 
damage due to tne defendant's activities. Judge Pratt further 
held that the "federal interest" was not limited to the rights of 
the soldiers, but extended to the liability of war contractors which 
would undoubtedly affect future dealings between the contractor 
and the government. 
The Court was careful to limit its holding saying that by per-
mitting it in this case, it does not mean that there is a substantial 
federal interest in every product liability suit brought by a vet-
eran against a government war contractor: 
A lone veteran suing the supplier of a single piece of defective mili-
tary machinery would implicate only a minimal federal interest . . . 
But this litigation, in contrast, involves suits by many veterans 
against five war contractors who supplied a product used for some 
nine years in military operations across a large portion of Vietnam. 
The estimated number of involved veterans ranges from thousands to 
millions, and the estimated potential liability of the five war contrac-
tors ranges from millions to billions of dollars. As the number of vet-
erans and the size of the claims against the war contractors increase, 
so the federal interest in this litigation expands.l81 
ii) Effect on Federal Interests Should State Law Be Applied 
Were Agent Orange litigation governed by state law, the Court 
found that different state laws would be applied to essentially 
similar claims by Vietnam veterans and their families against the 
five different war contractors. It further held that application of 
varying state laws would burden federal interests by creating un-
certainty as to the rights of both the veterans and the war con-
tractors.ISS Judge Pratt concluded that portion of his decision by 
saying that the application of state law in the litigation would 
from federal sources and governed by federal authority. So also we think are interfer-
ences with that relationship . .. 1d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
131 38 U.S.C. § 310 et seq . 
.. > Supra note 128 at pp. 19-20 (citations omitted). 
188 1d. at 21. The Court cited the extreme example where the application of different 
state statutes of limitation to claims by veterans who were injured together in Vietnam, 
but who lived in different states before or after service. 
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burden substantial federal interests. 1M 
iii) Effect on State Interests Should State Law Be Displaced By 
Federal Common Law 
The United States Supreme Court's caution on state law dis-
placement by federal common law enunciated in DeKalb, supra, 
was noted: " . . . the issue of whether to displace state law on an 
issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress."181 
The Agent Orange defendant war contractors argued that it 
would be improper to hold that "state law be displaced by an un-
precedented federal common law of products liability."188 In re-
jecting this -argument, Judge Pratt held that the negligence and 
strict product liability claims of the Agent Orange litigation did 
not fall under the developed body of state tort law, holding that 
"state tort law has not yet evolved rules to govern the duties of 
federal war contractors to soldiers", distinguishing Whitaker v. 
Harvel-Kilgore Corporation, Boeing Airplane Company v. Brown 
and Adams v. General Dynamics Corporation.137 As to the dis-
placement issue, the Court concluded: 
State law has not considered the complex question of a war contrac-
tor's liability to soldiers injured by toxic chemicals subject to federal 
regulation while engaged in combat and serving abroad. Because state 
law is no more or less developed as to such claims than federal com-
mon law, application of federal common law thereto would not signifi-
cantly displace state law.1SB 
This precedent-setting aspect of the Agent Orange litigation 
evoked a rapid appeal by Dow and the other corporate defen-
dants. The Second Circuit has indicated that it will give an early 
hearing to this important issue.189 Judge Pratt's federal common 
law decision has now been adopted by the Third Circuit in Jaffe 
v. United States. 140 With a two-judge panel citing it with ap-
184 I d. at 22 . 
... 433 U.S. at 32. 
188 Supra note 134. 
m 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969); 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); 405 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975), affirmed 535 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1976), respectively. 
188 Supra note 128 at p. 23. 
188 Author's interview with Attorney Victor Yannacone of February 1, 1980, following 
Court's preliminary hearings on third-party joinder of the United States. 
14. Jaffee v. United States, (3d Cir.) (No. 79-1543) Feb. 20, 1980, summarized in West's 
FEDERAL CASE NEWS, Mar. 21, 1980, Vol. 3, No. 12. 
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proval, it would appear that the Second Circuit may be hard 
pressed to overturn their own District Court's ruling on this 
issue.141 
b.) Denial of Implied Private Cause of Action for Toxic Chemi-
cal Injuries 
The plaintiff's argued that a "private" cause of action existed 
"that could be implied" from the four toxic substance related 
statutes (FEPCA, FIFRA, TOSCA and CPSA) under the aegis of 
28 USC § 1331.141 In rejecting this argument, the Court pointed 
out that FIFRA, as amended by FEPCA, treats defoliants as 
"pesticides" which has led the parties to refer to 2,4,5-T as a pes-
ticide, although common usage would undoubtedly categorize 
2,4,5-T and other defoliants as herbicides and not pesticides. Be-
cause of FIFRA, the other two statutes by which the plaintiffs 
sought to imply a private right of action, TOSCA and CPSA, were 
held specifically inapplicable to the litigation, both having specific 
exclusions as to "any pesticides" (within the statutory definition 
as set forth in FIFRA and FEPCA) from coverage by the respec-
tive acts. In With FIFRA, as amended by FEPCA, the only re-
maining statutory base for an "implied private cause of action", 
the Court after analyzing the four tests used by the Supreme 
Court in Cort v. Ash,144 concluded: "a private cause of action 
~ should not be read into FIFRA, or any other toxic chemical stat-
ute, and that the plaintiffs' claims asserted thereunder must be 
dismissed. "1411 
14' Decision by Circuit Judge John J. Gibbons, concurred in result by Circuit Judge A. 
Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
, •• Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint, MDL No. 381, filed 79-10-15 [herein-
after T A VC] at p. 2. 
, •• TOSCA exclusion: 15 U.S.C. § 2606(2)(B) (ii); CPSA exclusion: 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (a) 
(1) (D). 
, •• 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly provid-
ing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was enacted [citation omitted] that is, does the statute 
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second. . . legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? [citation omitted]. Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a rem-
edy for the plaintiff? [citations omitted] And finally, is the cause of action one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely in federal law? 
, •• District Court Finding of Federal Common Law at p. 8. 
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c.) Establishment of a Trust Fund for the Class Recovery 
The plaintiff's lead attorney bases his trust fund theory on 
what he describes as the basic fiduciary obligation of a corpora-
tion that is marketing a dangerous product to set aside moneys to 
compensate potential victims of its products. I •• With no legal pre-
cedent, per se, the plaintiffs turned to the insurance industry and 
the methodology of retrospective risk assessment. Any insurance 
company on a new type of risk will do what is called retrospective 
risk assessment. This involves more than a mere judgment call of 
a claims underwriter. In the early years of a risk that is insured 
an amount is set aside which, in the best judgment of the insuror, 
will cover the expected costs to cover the claims for that year. At 
the end of the first year of operation of the risk industry, the in-
suror reviews the incurred losses and adds a loading constant, 
which is a factor for overhead,and then divides by the number of 
premium payors and comes up with a "premium." Most carriers 
look back over a prior three-year period of assessment and then 
compute the risk. In essence, it becomes a "moving average." 
Plaintiffs' attorney Yannacone explained that in the Agent Or-
ange litigation, it is assumed that there will be a certain number 
of cases of say, cancer, which will become evident following some 
seven to twenty years of latency after exposure in South Vietnam. 
A trustee administered claims organization, working under the 
supervision of the court (or a specially appointed Master), would 
wait for the claims to be adjudicated in a certain year. The defen-
dants would then pay into the trust fund (assuming arguendo 
that liability is found) an amount sufficient to cover the claims so 
adjudicated. The following year a like computation would be 
made. At this point, the retrospective risk assessment system 
would be implemented and used in the future to cover the un-
known number of claimants (both service-persons as well as the 
children in the class) who are argued to be "at risk"I.7 -members 
of the class whose symptoms have not as yet surfaced. The plain-
tiffs proposed that compensatory damages would be paid out on 
an annuity basis to cover the costs of treatment as received. Pain 
and suffering or punitive damages (if awarded) would be paid out 
separately by means of lump sum payments. The plaintiffs esti-
mate that the bulk of damages (if successful) would be in the 
H. Author's interview, supra note 139. 
H. Supra note 127. 
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form of compensatory damages. 
If such a trust fund system is approved by the Court, it would 
answer many of the criticisms of increased product liability 
awards as being crippling to American industry. Attempts have 
been made in the past by major corporate manufacturers to es-
tablish private reserve funds to cover potential product liability. 
These, however, have been held taxable by the IRS. This has had 
the effect of reducing the amount of money available for corpo-
rate dividends. Stockholders would not be enthusiastic over the 
prospect of reduced corporate dividends, particularly when ad-
vised of the "dangerous product" basis for setting such a reserve 
aside. As an alternative, several large corporate manufacturers at-
tempted to set up off-shore insurance companies (in the Bahamas 
etc.), and the IRS recently held that such wholly-owned insurance 
companies whose main client was the parent corporation were in 
effect "subsidiaries" of the parent corporation and thus subject to 
pre-tax assessment as another form of a reserve fund.14e If the 
trust fund concept of damage payment is approved by the Court, 
it would be a court-supervised trust fund and thus tax-exempt. 
The trust fund would be administered so that liability claims 
against the fund would be limited (as a maximum) to the claims 
that could be paid from the fund for anyone year. Were addi-
tional claims adjudicated in excess of the amount held in trust for 
that year, they would be held over and assume a priority for pay-
ment from the next year (in a similar manner to admiralty and 
other in rem claims payments). 
The plaintiffs concede that it would be difficult for corporate 
defendants (even of the size of Dow, Hercules et al) to set aside a 
reserve under normal techniques of damage payment, adequate to 
cover the potential of future "at risk" claims. However, by use of 
annuity payments and the trust fund concept, the corporate de-
fendants could cut the reserve value from a figure possibly in the 
area of 20 billion dollars, to a commuted value of two or three 
billion, thus making such a recovery manageable and within the 
realm of feasibility. 
Each of the corporate defendants have affirmatively pleaded 
"set-off" to all payments received by the plaintiffs from collateral 
sources (VA, Social Security/HEW and DOD benefits).14' The 
... Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977, § 162, at 53-56. 
If' Defendant Dow Chemical's Answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended Verified Com-
----~----- ~~~--~~~~~----
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plaintiffs, acting as private attorneys general, have asked for re-
imbursement by the trust fund for such payment, thus being a 
form of subrogation on behalf of the United States against the 
trust fund. 
d.) Extension of Enterprise Liability 
Anticipating causation and proof problems as to which particu-
lar herbicide, manufactured by which particular manufacturer 
caused a particular plaintiff class member's injuries, the plaintiffs 
have argued for extension of the enterprise liability theory to 
cover the causation and proof problems.1I10 Similar causation/ 
proof problems have been litigated in other industries. One of the 
primary cases was the blasting cap case Hall & Chance v. Du-
pontlll decided by Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of 
New York. Those cases permitted recovery against the entire 
blasting cap industry, premised on enterprise liability (the nature 
of explosion of a blasting cap is such that no evidence remained 
from which a determination could be made as to which particular 
manufacturer produced the defective cap). More recently in In re 
Beverly Hills Fire Litigation,1I11 the Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky ruled the entire aluminum wiring 
industry liable for damages resulting from the disastrous Ken-
tucky nightclub fire. 
The Second Circuit in Ezaqui v. Dow Chemical Corporationll8 
in distinguishing Ezaqui from the principles of Summers v. 
Tice1u intimated that it accepts enterprise liability as the law of 
the Second Circuit. If that is so, it would appear that many of the 
plaint, 19th Aff. Def., Dec. 10, 1979; Defendant Hercules' Answer to PI's TAVC, 21st Aff. 
Def., Dec. 10, 1979; Def. Monsanto's Answer to Plaintiffs' TAVC, 20th Aff. Def., Dec. 10, 
1979; and Defendant Thompson-Hayward's Answer to Plaintiffs' TAVC, 16th Aff. Def., 
Dec. 10, 1979, All filed in MOL No. 381, E.D.N.Y . 
.. 0 P,1aintiffs' Rejoinder Memorandum Supporting Class Certification, December 21, 
1979, MOL No. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) at p. 12 . 
... 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See Headnote 28. 
"" In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, (E.D.Ky. 1979) Index 7779 (1979). Also see 
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1979, p.1 discussing the application of enterprise liability to the DES 
cases. Contra, Gray v, United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tenn. 1978) . 
••• 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979). 
'M Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d SO, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), case involving two hunters who 
simultaneously shot injuring third hunter (plaintiff), holding that where plaintiff has 
shown fault on the part of two or more defendants, and there is equal probability that 
either defendant caused the injury, the court will shift to the defendants the burden of 
showing exoneration from liability. 
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usual proximate cause issues as to which particular manufacturer 
made the particular damage-causing herbicide would be moot. 
e.) Establishment of An "At Risk" Class 
One of the unique arguments arising in this litigation is the es-
tablishment of an "at risk" series of sub-classes within the Class 
Action (under FRCP 23). These sub-classes would include veter-
ans without current symptoms, but at risk of genetic and somatic 
damage, and veterans' children at risk of genetic damage. III Thus 
the "at risk" class may potentially contain as yet unborn children. 
At this time, scientists do not know if such injuries will be by 
autosomal dominant genes or autosomal recessive genes. If expe-
rience and further scientific research prove the genetic damage 
alleged to be caused by autosomal dominant genes, then its ef-
fects would be expected to die out within one generation (thus 
reducing the future size of the "at risk" class).1116 If however, it is 
found to be autosomal recessive genetic damage, this means that 
it could be carried into succeeding generations, thus expanding 
the "at risk" class. 
f.) United States Joined as Third-Party Defendant 
In January 1980, Dow Chemical Company filed a third-party 
complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) 
and 2671 et seq., seeking to join the United States, DOD, each of 
the Armed Services, USDA, HEW, Interior and the VA as third-
party defendants. In sum, Dow alleges that it manufactured the 
herbicides to the USA's direct specifications; Dow alleges inability 
to control the methods and amount of Agent Orange used; that it 
was misused (by excessive sprayings) over the objections of the 
manufacturer(s), and, as a result of the United States' negligence 
in use and misuse and failure to warn the potentially exposed ser-
vice persons, that if the defendants are found liable, then the 
United States government must indemnify or contribute all 
amounts that the defendant manufacturers are required to pay 
(as a result of the class action).117 This appears to be a classic 
••• TAVC at pp. 6-7 . 
... E.g., see generally McKuSICK, VICTOR A., Mendelian Inheritance in Man, (5th ed. 
1978). 
107 Third-Party Complaint of the Dow Chemical Company joining the United States et 
al, E.D.N.Y., 79C 1195, dated January 4, 1980. 
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third-party joinder, typical of such products liability litigation. It 
may be anticipated that the Government will move for dismissal 
as a third-party. In all probability this motion for dismissal will 
be based upon several of the immunities or exclusions of the Fed-
eral government as contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
supra, the Tucker Act,11l8 the Defense Production Act, m or under 
the Feres' doctrine. leo 
2.) Public Interest Suit, United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia 
The second major Agent Orange litigation has been filed by Mr. 
Lewis Milford, Deputy Director of the National Veterans Law 
Center at American University, a public interest law clinic. This 
suit was filed in May 1979 in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. It is also filed as a class action (similar to the product 
liability suit, supra), but includes three non-profit veterans orga-
nizations in addition to the eight named plaintiffs (injured veter-
ans). These three plaintiff veteran organizations include The Na-
tional Association of Concerned Veterans (NACV), Agent Orange 
Victims International (AOV!), and Concerned American Veterans 
Against Toxins (CAVEAT). 
Named as defendants are Max Cleland, Administrator of Veter-
ans Affairs of the VA and the Veterans Administration per se. 
The complaint does not ask for damages, but is a complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief framed in the constitutional re-
quirements for due process, challenging the V A's failure to pub-
lish in the Federal Register and conduct" . . . a rulemaking pro-
ceeding allowing public notice and comment regarding ... [VA] 
rules that established procedures and substantive criteria for de-
termining whether a veteran who applies for [VA] disability bene-
fits should receive such benefits based on exposure to herbicide 
Agent Orange while performing military service in Vietnam."ISI 
Plaintiffs rely upon the requirements for notice and due process 
as set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
,.. The Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505. 
lO. The Defense Production Act, Title 50, Appendix § 2061 et. seq. 
, •• Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See also Stencel Aero Engineering v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1974), where the Supreme Court refused a defense manufac-
turer's indemnification claim against the United States, reaffirming the Feres doctrine. 
,., White v. Cleland, D.C. Civil Action No. 79-1426, at 1-29 (Filed May 31, 1979), [here-
inafter White v. Max Cleland and VA]. 
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§ 553 et seq., the VA's regulations (38 CFR § 1.12 et seq.) and the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1». UII 
x. CONCLUSION 
Agent Orange and its associated military and civilian herbicides 
containing 2,4,5-T with the contaminant dioxin have had far-
reaching impacts. These herbicides were obviously utilized before 
the full ramifications of their use and effects were sufficiently 
known. The complex panopoly of the scientific community, the 
academic community and various political factions (many of 
which were opposed to the United States involvement in Indo-
China) combined initially to lead to the herbicides' military usage 
being curtailed and then completely terminated, followed shortly 
thereafter, as the scientific body of evidence grew, to curtailment 
in many domestic and civilian usages. This use of herbicides 
caused major diplomatic changes for the United States and even-
tually led to renunciation of first-use of military herbicides as a 
national policy and the signing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 
Of the two major class-action suits flowing from Agent Orange, 
the multidistrict litigation suit may very possibly end up involv-
ing nearly a hundred federal district courts across the country 
(e.g. for final determination of individual damages for each of the 
individual plaintiffs, once liability was proven in the Multi-Dis-
trict-Litigation [MDL] Court). It may well be precedent-setting 
in the negligence and product liability areas of the law in the pre-
sent decision of the trial court establishing federal common law in 
those areas (currently expected to be heard by the Second Cir-
cuit). The Eastern District of New York (and almost certainly the 
Second Circuit) will have to pass upon the unique "at risk" con-
cept for a class of plaintiffs. These class members, it is argued, 
were presumably exposed to the toxic substance dioxin, yet have 
,., APA - 5 U.S.C. § 553 requires: (1) written notice (of proposed rule making) in the 
Federal Register; (2) opportunity to participate; (3) notice of not less than 30 days; and (4) 
right to petition for issuance of amendment or appeal of the rule. 
VA Regulations (regarding Public Participation in Regulatory Development), 39 CFR § 
1.12 has similar notice and due process requirements for VA Rule Making: General Notice 
(of proposed V A regulations) must be published in the Federal Register; receive written 
comments and opportunity to participate unless exception (to public participation) is au-
thorized by the VA Administrator or Deputy when concurred in by General Counsel (of 
the VA]. 
FOIA - 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) requiring mandatory publication of agency rules and 
regulations. 
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not as yet developed visible symptoms of their exposure. One may 
anticipate the use of such an "at risk" concept (if it is accepted 
by the MDL Court and the Second Circuit) in a host of other 
product liability contexts, particularly in the drug or other "in-
herently dangerous" product fields. There is the possiblity, how-
ever, that the District Court may defer to the legislature in solv-
ing the problems of the victims of Agent Orange exposure. A 
little-discussed, yet ever-present element of the litigation is its in-
ternational impact. If the present Agent Orange MDL litigation 
remains viable and, assuming arguendo that liability were to be 
found against some or all of the defendants (possibly including 
the United States government), then this may open the door to a 
series of litigatory or diplomatic issues, either in the United 
States or before one or more of the world tribunals (i.e. the Inter-
national Court of Justice, the United Nations, etc.), including 
possible war damage claims by Vietnamese persons exposed. 
As the body of scientific knowledge grows and definitive data 
on teratogenicity, mutagenicity, fetotoxicity, and carcinogenicity 
confirms or denies the sometimes hysterical claims (both ways) as 
to 2,4,5-T and dioxin, we may anticipate the possibility of greater 
constraints on the use of 2,4,5-T and increased refinement in both 
its manufacture and in tests and protocols to detect its presence. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE TOXICITY OF SEVERAL HERBICIDES 
Herbicide Toxicity a Toxicityb 
2,4-D butyl LD 50 * (orally in mice) LD 50 (rats)-
ester (Agent 375 mg/kg 400-500 mg/kg 
Pink, Green) 300-1000 mg/kg 
2,4,5-T** LD 50 (orally in rats) LD 50 (rats)-
300 mg/kg 300mg/kg 
Cacodylic acid LD 50 (s.c.) (in dogs) LD 50 (rats)-
(Agent Blue) 1.0 g/kg 830 mg/kg 
Picloram LD 50 (orally in mice) LD 50 (rats)-
(Agent White) 2.0-2.0 g/kg 8.2 g/kg 
* LD 50 - An acute dose which is fatal to 50 percent of test animals. 
** N.B. Agent Orange is a 50:50 mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. 
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